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1.  Introduction 
  It is well known that the growth of multinational enterprise (MNE) activity in the form of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown at a faster rate than most other international 
transactions, particularly trade flows between countries.  In many ways, MNEs are the control 
centers for a large portion of international transactions other than FDI.  For example, almost half 
of trade flows are intrafirm; i.e., trade within an MNE.
1   
  These real-world trends have led to substantial recent interest by the international 
economics literature to empirically investigate the fundamental factors that drive FDI behavior.  
This paper provides a critical review of this literature with a discussion of future research areas.  
The literature is large enough that a comprehensive review is not possible.  Instead this paper 
highlights what the author considers the more important and novel papers in the empirical 
literature on the determinants of FDI.  The topic of the effects of MNE activity on host and home 
countries will not be addressed, but could easily be the focus of its own literature survey. On a 
final note, this survey’s focus will be more recent papers, and the interested reader should refer 
to Caves (1996) for a broader discussion of earlier papers in the literature.  
  To organize ideas, we first examine the literature that motivates and tests its analysis of 
FDI determinants from a partial equilibrium view of the MNE.  After briefly discussing the 
internal firm-specific factors that motivate a firm to become an MNE in the first place, we then 
examine the external factors that are likely determinants of the location and magnitude of FDI by 
MNEs.  These external factors range from exchange rates and taxes, to factors that are likely 
more endogenous with FDI activity, such as trade protection and trade flows.  These latter 
“determinants” of FDI, such as trade flows, opens up the larger issue of the quite varying 
motivations for FDI which are ignored to a large degree by the partial equilibrium literatures on   2 
the effects of exchange rates and taxes.  Such questions are key in the literature reviewed in the 
second half of the paper – the recent work to develop the theory and estimation of general 
equilibrium models of MNE behavior. 
 
2. Firm Characteristics that Affect the MNE Decision 
  The most fundamental question about FDI activity is why a firm would choose to service 
a foreign market through affiliate production, rather than other options such as exporting or 
licensing arrangements.  The standard answer revolves around the presence of intangible assets 
specific to the firm, such as technologies, managerial skills, etc.  Such assets are public goods 
within a firm to the extent that using such assets in one plant does not diminish use of the asset in 
other plants.  This explains why firms with such assets are more likely to have multiple plants, 
ceteris paribus, but not necessarily why they would be multinational.  To explain why such assets 
lead to an MNE decision, we often note the potential for market failure connected with these 
assets.  A standard hypothesis is that it is difficult to fully appropriate rents from such assets 
through an arrangement with an external party.  For example, a licensee will not offer full value 
in negotiations over a contract if the intangible asset is not fully revealed, but the licensor will 
not want to reveal the asset fully until a contract is finalized.  In such situations, the optimal 
decision may be for the firm to internalize the market transaction, which would mean 
establishing its own production affiliate in the market.  Early conceptualization of this notion 
includes Oliver Williamson’s work on transactions costs, and the development of the ownership-
location-internalization (OLI) paradigm (e.g., see Rugman, 1980, and Dunning, 2001).  Recent 
work has applied more formal theory of the firm, such as hold-up issues and agency theory, to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 For example, Census (2001) finds that 47% of the U.S.’s trade with other countries was intrafirm in 1999.   3 
provide more formal frameworks for understanding market failures that lead to a firm becoming 
an MNE (e.g., see chapter 5 of Navaretti and Venables, 2004, for an overview).
2 
  Testing these hypotheses is difficult because the firm-specific factors leading to the FDI 
decision are inherently unobservable.  As a result, R&D intensity (the ratio of research and 
development expenditures to assets or sales) and advertising intensity have been primarily used 
as proxies for the presence of intangible assets and then used as explanatory variables in firm-
level studies of whether firms are “multinational” or not.  In fact, it has become standard to 
include such variables in any firm-level analysis of the FDI decision.  My own experience and 
reading of the literature suggests that R&D intensity is almost invariably positively correlated 
with multinationality regardless of the data sample, while the evidence for advertising intensity is 
much more mixed.  An alternative test is provided by Morck and Yeung (1992) which found that 
publicly-traded U.S. firms announcing foreign acquisitions experienced positive abnormal 
returns to their stock only if they had a significant level of R&D and advertising intensity.      
  In the final analysis, however, it is not possible to suggest that these empirical analyses 
irrefutably confirm the internalization hypothesis.  Such measures as R&D and advertising 
intensity may be proxying for other forces that lead to FDI, rather than those connected with the 
internalization hypothesis.  In addition, there is evidence that firms that are “lacking” R&D 
intensity (or innovation) relative to their industry competitors are the ones more likely to engage 
in FDI.  For example, Kogut and Chang (1991) and Blonigen (1997) provide evidence that 
Japanese firms’ acquisition FDI in the US was motivated by accessing firm-specific assets, not 
necessarily due to internalization of their own firm-specific assets.  These motivations may or 
may not be contradictory to internalization motivations for FDI.  
                                                            
2 Feenstra and Hanson (2004) provides an important empirical contribution to this mainly theoretical literature 
where they find that the choice of ownership by a multinational firm in a Chinese factory is related to “thickness” of   4 
  In the rest of this literature review the focus is much more on the exogenous and policy 
factors that affect the magnitude of FDI that we observe, not whether FDI will occur or not in the 
first place.  Industry and country-level studies of partial equilibrium specifications either ignore 
such micro-level factors or assume they are controlled for though an average industry- or 
country-level fixed effect.  The general equilibrium work on the other hand models it directly, 
but then ties it back to country-level features (primarily country endowments) to again generate a 
country-level average effect.  For example, FDI is more likely to originate in countries abundant 
in capital and skilled-labor which are necessary for generating the firm-specific assets that create 
the need to internalize through FDI.    
 
3. Partial Equilibrium Analysis of External Factors Affecting FDI Decisions and Location 
A large body of literature examining determinants of FDI begins with a partial 
equilibrium firm-level framework based in industrial organization and finance to motivate 
empirical analysis.  These studies then typically examine how exogenous macroeconomic factors 
affect the firm’s FDI decision, with the primary focus on exchange rate movements, taxes, and to 
a more limited extent, tariffs.  Earlier studies often then use industry-level (or even country-
level) data to explore these hypotheses, while more recent work has had firm- and plant-level 
data available to more appropriately match the firm-level theory. 
 
3.1. Exchange Rate Effects 
The effect of exchange rates on FDI has been examined both with respect to changes in 
the bilateral level of the exchange rate between countries and in the volatility of exchange rates.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the export market and the extent to which this affects the relationship-specificity between the multinational firm and 
the Chinese factories.     5 
Until Froot and Stein (1991), the common wisdom was that (expected) changes in the level of the 
exchange rate would not alter the decision by a firm to invest in a foreign country.  In rough 
terms, while an appreciation of a firm’s home country’s currency would lower the cost of assets 
abroad, the (expected) nominal return goes down as well in the home currency, leaving the rate 
of return identical.
3   
Froot and Stein (1991) presents an imperfect capital markets story for why a currency 
appreciation may actually increase foreign investment by a firm.  Imperfect capital markets mean 
that the internal cost of capital is lower than borrowing from external sources.  Thus, an 
appreciation of the currency leads to increased firm wealth and provides the firm with greater 
low-cost funds to invest relative to the counterpart firms in the foreign country that experience 
the devaluation of their currency.  Froot and Stein (1991) provides empirical evidence of 
increased inward FDI with currency depreciation through simple regressions using a small 
number of annual US aggregate FDI observations, which Stevens (1998) finds is quite fragile to 
specification.  Klein and Rosengren (1994), however, confirms that exchange rate depreciation 
increases US FDI using various samples of US FDI disaggregated by country source and type of 
FDI.   
Blonigen (1997) provides another way in which changes in the exchange rate level may 
affect inward FDI for a host country.  If FDI by a firm is motivated by acquisition of assets that 
are transferable within a firm across many markets without a currency transaction (e.g., firm-
specific assets, such as technology, managerial skills, etc.), then an exchange rate appreciation of 
the foreign currency will lower the price of the asset in that foreign currency, but will not 
necessarily lower the nominal returns.  In other words, a depreciation of a country’s currency 
may very well allow a “fire sale” of such transferable assets to foreign firms operating in global 
                                                            
3 McCulloch (1989, p. 188) provides a simple sketch of this argument.   6 
markets versus domestic firms that may not have such access.  Blonigen uses industry-level data 
on Japanese mergers and acquisition FDI into the US to test this hypothesis and finds strong 
support of increased inward US acquisition FDI by Japanese firms in response to real dollar 
depreciations relative to the yen.  As predicted, Blonigen finds that these exchange rate effects 
on acquisition FDI are primarily for high-technology industries where firm-specific assets are 
likely of substantial importance.   
Other studies have generally found consistent evidence that short-run movements in 
exchange rates lead to increased inward FDI, including Grubert and Mutti (1991), Swenson 
(1994), and Kogut and Chang (1996), with  limited evidence that the effect is larger for merger 
and acquisition FDI (see, e.g., Klein and Rosengren, 1994).  Thus, the evidence has largely been 
consistent with the Froot and Stein (1991) and Blonigen (1997) hypotheses.  One serious issue in 
the literature is that these exchange rate effects have been tested almost exclusively with US 
data, though some studies have focused on US outbound FDI, while others have used US 
inbound FDI.   
These previous studies have also made the implicit assumption that exchange rate effects 
on FDI are symmetric and proportional to the size of the exchange rate movement.  The financial 
crises of the late 1990s have just begun to spur a small nascent literature on the effects of large 
sudden exchange rate swings on a variety of economic variables, including FDI by MNEs.  
Lipsey (2001) studies U.S. FDI into three regions as they experienced currency crises (Latin 
America in 1982, Mexico in 1994, and East Asia in 1997) and finds that FDI flows are much 
more stable during these crises than other flows of capital.  Desai, Foley and Forbes (2004) 
compares the performance of U.S. foreign affiliates with local firms when faced with a currency 
crisis and find that U.S. foreign affiliates increase their investment, sales and assets significantly 
more than local firms during and subsequent to the crisis.  They attribute the differences to   7 
MNEs abilities to finance investment internally to a larger extent than local firms.  While these 
papers are quite informative, there are clearly more questions to be answered in this literature. 
A final related strand of the literature studies how uncertainty and expectations about 
future exchange rate movements may affect FDI decisions.  An early paper by Cushman (1985) 
lays out a very nice firm-level model of international investment that depends on the interaction 
of exchange rate expectations, trade linkages, and financing options the firm may have.  
Specifically, the paper examines four possible regimes for an MNE: 1) Foreign production and 
sales, either financed by foreign or domestic sources, 2) Direct investment financed 
domestically, but foreign production and sales with a imported input from the home country, 3) 
Direct investment financed domestically, but domestic production and sales with an imported 
input from the foreign country, and 4) Domestic financing of investment for production at home 
with export sales to foreign market or domestically-financed foreign investment for production 
and sales in foreign market.   
The paper’s treatment of both the MNE’s financing options and its trade linkages is the 
strength of the paper.  However, this is a weakness as well, since the effect of the exchange rate 
and its expected movements varies considerably across models and is often ambiguous in sign 
for a given model.  In addition, his firm-level modeling shows that if firms are heterogeneous in 
their financing options and trade linkages, then examination of aggregate data (industry- or 
country-level) may very well show ambiguous results that hide these very real firm-level effects.  
Cushman, however, tests his firm-level model with data on U.S. bilateral country-level FDI, 
though data availability in the 1980s makes this understandable.
4  Cushman’s empirical analysis 
finds evidence that an expected real appreciation of the home currency increases FDI, whereas 
                                                            
4 The final sample includes 16 yearly observations for five U.S. partners – Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the 
United Kingdom.   8 
the current level of the exchange rate has no consistently significant impact.  These results with 
respect to the expected exchange rate effect are consistent with certain versions of models 3 and 
4 noted above.  The firm-level modeling of the Cushman paper is impressive, but there is a clear 
need for more updated work using firm-level data to accurately test its hypotheses.  
Campa (1993) lays out a much simpler and (perhaps more) elegant approach than 
Cushman (1985) to examine how exchange rate uncertainty affects FDI based on options theory 
in Dixit (1989).  Greater exchange rate uncertainty increases the option for firms to wait until 
investing in a market, depressing current FDI.  Campa finds evidence for this using data on FDI 
into the US in the wholesale industry.  Again, a broader firm-level database would be likely 
preferred to test these hypotheses and Tomlin (2000) also points out that the Campa (1993) 
estimates are sensitive to empirical specification.  A related paper by Goldberg and Kolstad 
(1995) alternatively hypothesizes that exchange rate uncertainty will increase FDI by risk averse 
MNEs if such uncertainty is correlated with export demand shocks in the markets they intend to 
serve.  They confirm this hypothesis with empirical analysis relying on quarterly bilateral data on 
US FDI with Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom. 
In summary, the literature has derived important and interesting firm-level models of how 
exchange rate uncertainty can affect FDI flows, depending on firm characteristics.  Ironically, the 
modeling is much stronger than the empirical work, and there has been very little firm-level 
empirical analysis of these hypotheses.  In addition, two of the main papers in the area – Campa 
(1993) and Goldberg and Kolstad (1995)  – have apparently contradictory hypotheses which both 
confirm using US data on FDI.  Thus, the topic of exchange rate effects on FDI is an area rich for 
future work.  One related issue that likely deserves more attention is how one measures expected 
exchange rate levels, uncertainty, or even volatility.  Each of these papers has their own way of   9 
measuring these variables, but further investigation into appropriate measures and sensitivity of 
results to alternative measures deserves some attention as well.    
 
  3.2. Taxes  
  Interest in the effects of taxes on FDI has been considerable from both international and 
public economists.  An obvious hypothesis is that higher taxes discourage FDI with the more 
important question one of magnitude.  De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) provides an even more 
detailed discussion of the literature than that provided here and finds a median tax-elasticity of 
FDI of -3.3 across 25 studies. However, some of the more well-placed articles in the literature 
have highlighted why such a number may be quite misleading.  As these papers point out, the 
effects of taxes on FDI can vary substantially by type of taxes, measurement of FDI activity, and 
tax treatment in the host and parent countries.  Another important issue is that a MNE potentially 
faces taxes in the host and the home countries.  Countries have different ways of addressing this 
double taxation issue, which further complicates expected effects of taxes on FDI.
5   
  Most of the literature on taxation effects of FDI point to Hartman’s papers (1984;1985) as 
the starting point of the literature, as these were the first to point out a way in which certain types 
of FDI may surprisingly not be very sensitive to taxes.  The key insight by Hartman is that 
earnings by an affiliate in foreign country will ultimately be subject to parent and host country 
taxes regardless of whether it is repatriated or reinvested in the foreign affiliate to generate 
further earnings.  There is no way to ultimately avoid foreign taxes on these earnings.  On the 
other hand, new investment decisions consider transfers of new capital from the parent to the 
affiliate that do not originate from the host country and, thus, have not yet incurred any foreign 
                                                            
5 There is also a significant literature on transfer pricing (shifting income via intrafirm pricing to minimize tax 
burden) which is beyond the scope of this review, but is likely endogenous with decisions of FDI.    10 
taxes.  This has a number of important implications.  First, it means that firms will want to 
finance new FDI through retained earnings as much as possible, before turning to new infusions 
from the parent.  Second, this means that FDI through retained earnings should only respond to 
host country tax rates, not parent country tax rates or the parent country’s method of dealing with 
double taxation issues.  FDI through new transfers of capital, on the other hand, will potentially 
respond to both parent and host country taxes and rates of return available in both the parent and 
host markets.   
Hartman (1984) tests this by examining behavior of foreign affiliates in the United States.  
Important for the empirical analysis, Hartman is only able to gather data on host country (US) 
tax rates and returns, but not parent (foreign) country tax rates and returns. Thus, he separately 
regresses retained earnings FDI and new transfer FDI on the host country (US) tax rate, not 
controlling for these unobservable parent country tax rates.  He finds that retained earnings FDI 
responds significantly to the host country tax rate as hypothesized.  Transfer FDI, however, does 
not respond significantly to host country tax rates which can then be explained by not controlling 
for parent country tax rates (and differences in returns across the countries).   
This estimation strategy by Hartman is clearly not ideal for identifying the hypotheses.  
Ideally one would want information on the parent country tax rates and explicitly control for 
these in the estimation, rather that assuming that their omission will bias a current observable 
variable’s coefficient to insignificance.   Slemrod (1990) goes a step in this direction by using 
disaggregated country-level panel data and controlling for the system used by the parent country 
to deal with double taxation (those that allow MNEs to use foreign repatriated income as a credit 
on their parent tax liability and those that allow for exemptions), which he argues should matter   11 
for the tax response.
6  His results are decidedly mixed often revealing an insignificant tax 
response for retained earnings FDI or even a negative response.  This study has clearly cast 
doubt on the Hartman model, yet there have been no significant attempts since to re-estimate 
with better data or approaches. 
Slemrod’s (1990) idea that policies to deal with double taxation may affect tax 
responsiveness did take hold in the literature.  The common distinction is between territorial 
countries that do not tax any income outside of the parent country, exempting foreign-earned 
income from tax liability, and a worldwide tax method which considers all earned income by its 
parent firms potentially taxable, but may treat foreign income in a number of ways to avoid 
double taxation of the MNE.  Two standard treatments to deal with this double taxation issue are 
for the home country to offer a credit or a deduction of foreign tax payment made by the MNE. 
The potential for these tax treatments to affect the analysis of FDI and taxation first 
played a large role in the literature as researchers began to examine the impact of a significant 
US tax reform in 1986 on inward US FDI.  Scholes and Wolfson (1990) hypothesizes that US 
FDI from MNEs under worldwide systems would likely increase when US tax rates increased!  
This seemingly counterintuitive notion comes from the realization that with a credit system, for 
example, the MNE would not see any increase in its tax liability under a worldwide taxation 
system.  On the other hand, the US domestic investors (and MNEs under a territorial tax system) 
would bear the full brunt of the added US tax liabilities.  With firms all bidding for the same 
assets in the US, the worldwide-tax MNEs would be advantaged and invest more.      
While Scholes and Wolfson (1990) performs only very simple statistical tests to show that US 
FDI goes up after 1986 without controlling for other factors, Swenson (1994) does a more 
                                                            
6 A number of previous studies to Slemrod (1990) had explored other issues with Hartman’s results, but continued to 
confirm his findings.  See de Mooij and Ederveen (2003) for a discussion of these studies.   12 
careful examination of the Scholes and Wolfson hypothesis by examining the differential impact 
that the U.S. 1986 tax reform had on FDI across industries that had varying changes in tax rates 
after the reform.  Specifically, Swenson examines industry panel data from 1979 through 1991, 
exploiting the industry variation in tax changes from the 1986 tax reform, and finds that FDI did 
indeed increase with greater average tax rates, particularly for worldwide taxation countries.  
One worrisome issue with Swenson’s study is that confirmation of the Scholes and Wolfson 
hypothesis is shown when using data on average tax rates, but rejected when using effective tax 
rates.  Auerbach and Hassett (1993) provides further evidence against the Scholes and Wolfson 
hypothesis by developing a model of FDI that predicts the types of US investments that should 
be encouraged by the tax reform for territorial-tax MNEs versus worldwide-tax MNEs.  In 
particular, their model shows that territorial-tax MNEs should have incentives to focus more on 
merger and acquisition (M&A) FDI, whereas worldwide-tax MNEs should have been 
discouraged from such FDI relative to investment in new equipment.  The data, however, suggest 
that the substantial increase in FDI after the 1986 US tax reform was through M&A FDI by 
MNEs from worldwide-tax countries (mainly Japan and the United Kingdom).   
Thus, in many ways, the effects of the 1986 tax reform on FDI are very much an open 
question to this day.  However, while the particular question is now somewhat dated, the notion 
that FDI from worldwide taxation countries that offer their parent firms credits should be 
relatively insensitive to tax rates is of continuing interest.  This is best represented by Hines 
(1996) which creatively brought the issue of the territorial- versus worldwide-tax treatment issue 
to the pre-existing literature by examining whether state-level taxes affect location of US inward 
FDI.  Previous studies examining the effect of state taxes on state location of FDI found   13 
insignificant results (see, e.g., Coughlin, Terza and Arromdee, 1991).
7  Like federal taxes, MNEs 
facing state-level taxes may differ in their responses based on whether they face a territorial-tax 
or worldwide-tax system in their parent country.   Hines’ (1996) empirical strategy is to 
investigate the distribution of FDI across U.S. states and examine the tax sensitivity of FDI into a 
state of “non-credit-system” foreign investors relative to that of “credit-system” foreign 
investors.  He finds that higher tax rates of 1% are associated with a 9% larger FDI decrease by 
the non-credit-system investors relative to the credit-system investors.   
  In summary, the literature has pointed out quite nicely that there is more than meets the 
eye initially when considering the effects of taxes on FDI.
8  MNEs face tax rates at a variety of 
levels in both the host and parent country and policies to deal with double taxation can 
substantially alter the effects of these taxes on a MNEs incentive to invest.  As has been alluded 
to above, empirical approaches and data samples have differed a fair amount, so that there are 
still significant questions about how much taxes (and tax reforms such as that in the US in 1986) 
affect FDI.  The evidence seems more convincing that a credit system to deal with foreign taxes 
by an MNE makes taxes in the host country relatively inconsequential.   
There are other weaknesses with the literature that clearly need to be addressed.  First, all 
the studies mentioned above examine (at best) industry-level data for models that are typically of 
firm-level activity.  This can create an issue with interpreting the empirical evidence back to the 
theory.  The most obvious example of this is the use of average tax rates as the variable of 
interest which has obvious errors-in-variables issues.  Whether average or effective tax rates are 
                                                            
7 As Hines (1999) points out, the evidence that state taxes affect domestic investment is likewise mixed. 
 
8 This paper is focused only on studies of taxation on the decision to FDI and the accompanying location decision.  
There is an extensive related literature that also examines how tax laws affect financing decisions, repatriation 
decisions (e.g., Foley, Desai, and Hines, 2001), and mode of FDI (e.g., Desai and Hines, 1999).   14 
preferred as a measurement of tax liability is rarely discussed, but can show quite different 
effects on FDI as exemplified by the Swenson (1994) study.   
The literature has also only recently begun to examine other related taxes beyond 
corporate income taxes.  For example, a recent working paper by Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) 
finds evidence that indirect business taxes have an effect on FDI that is in the same range as 
corporate income taxes.  In a similar vein, the effect of bilateral international tax treaties on FDI 
activity has been an unexplored issue empirically until just recently.  There are thousands of such 
tax treaties which negotiate reductions in countries’ withholding rates among other things.
9   
Hallward-Dreimeier (2003) and Blonigen and Davies (2004) find little evidence that these 




  The quality of institutions is likely an important determinant of FDI activity, particularly 
for less-developed countries for a variety of reasons.  First, poor legal protection of assets 
increases the chance of expropriation of a firm’s assets making investment less likely.  Poor 
quality of institutions necessary for well-functioning markets (and/or corruption) increases the 
cost of doing business and, thus, should also diminish FDI activity.  And finally, to the extent 
that poor institutions lead to poor infrastructure (i.e., public goods), expected profitability falls as 
does FDI into a market. 
                                                            
9 Withholding tax rates are applied to repatriated income above and beyond the corporate income taxes that have 
been the focus of the discussion so far.    
10 It is not always clear that promotion of FDI is a natural goal of the participants of these negotiations, as some have 
suggested that these treaties are more about uncovering tax evasion by MNEs.  In a related vein, Chisik and Davies 
(2004) examine the expected outcomes of bilateral tax treaties when one of the countries has substantially more FDI 
in the other country.  Their theory and statistical evidence suggests that such asymmetric bilateral partners are not 
able to negotiate as large of reductions in withholding tax rates as more symmetric pairs of countries.    15 
  While these basic hypotheses are non-controversial, estimating the magnitude of the 
effect of institutions on FDI is difficult because there are not any accurate measurements of 
institutions.  Most measures are some composite index of a country’s political, legal and 
economic institutions, developed from survey responses from officials or businessmen familiar 
with the country.  Comparability across countries is questionable when survey respondents vary 
across the countries.  In addition, institutions are quite persistent, so there is likely to be little 
informative variation over time within a country.    
For these reasons, while cross-country FDI studies often include measures of institutions 
and/or corruption, they do not often have it as a focus of the analysis.  Wei’s papers (2000a; 
2000b) are exceptions that show that a variety of corruption indices are strongly and negatively 
correlated with FDI, though other studies can be found that did not find such evidence (e.g., 
Wheeler and Mody, 1992).  Hines (1995) provides an interesting “natural experiment” approach 
by examining how the 1977 U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act which stipulated penalties for 
U.S. multinational firms found to be bribing foreign officials.  His estimates find a negative 
impact on U.S. FDI in the period following this Act.  Analysis of such natural experiments hold 
out the hope of even more convincing evidence in the future, though finding such natural 
experiments is often difficult.         
 
3.4. Trade protection  
  The hypothesized link between FDI and trade protection is seen as fairly clear by most 
trade economists – higher trade protection should make firms more likely to substitute affiliate 
production for exports to avoid the costs of trade production.  This is commonly termed tariff-
jumping FDI.  Perhaps because the theory is fairly simple and general, there have been few 
studies to specifically test this hypothesis.  Another possible reason is data-driven.  It is difficult   16 
to quantify non-tariff forms of protection in a consistent fashion across industries.  Many firm-
level studies have controlled for various trade protection programs using industry-level 
measures, but often with mixed results, including Grubert and Mutti (1991), Kogut and Chang 
(1996), and Blonigen (1997).  An alternative to industry measures is provided by antidumping 
measures which apply firm-specific antidumping duties that are often quite large.  Using these 
more precise measures of changes to a trade protection faced by a firm, Belderbos (1997) and 
Blonigen (2002) both find more robust evidence of tariff-jumping FDI, though Blonigen’s results 
strongly suggest that such responses are only seen from multinational firms based in developed 
countries.  This may be another reason why support for tariff-jumping of other measures of trade 
protection have been mixed – FDI requires substantial costs that many small exporting firms may 
not be able to finance or find profitable.  Indeed, trade protection may explicitly target such 
import sources where FDI is less likely.
11  This would suggest one way in which FDI and trade 
protection may be endogenous, an issue that has been hardly explored empirically.  An exception 
is Blonigen and Figlio (1998) that finds evidence that an increase in FDI into a U.S. Senator’s 
state or U.S. house representative’s district increases their likelihood to vote for further trade 
protection. 
     
3.5. Trade Effects 
The previous partial-equilibrium studies discussed to this point have largely ignored trade 
effects of FDI which are intimately connected with underlying motivations of FDI behavior.
12  
Perhaps the most commonly cited motivation for FDI is as a substitute for exports to a host 
country.  As laid out by the model of Buckley and Casson (1981), one can think of exports as 
                                                            
11 See Ellingsen and Warneryd (1999) for a theoretical analysis that derives an optimal tariff as one that does not 
cross a level that would lead to FDI by the foreign firms.   17 
involving lower fixed costs, but higher variable costs of transportation and trade barriers.  
Servicing the same market with affiliate sales from FDI allows one to substantially lower these 
variable costs, but likely involves higher fixed costs than exports.  This suggests a natural 
progression from exports to FDI once the foreign market’s demand for the MNE’s products 
reach a large enough scale (size).
13    
Early papers by Lipsey and Weiss (1981;1984) find a positive coefficient when 
regressing US outbound FDI measures to host countries on exports to the host countries, which is 
inconsistent with the notion of FDI replacing exports.  However, these papers ignore the 
endogeneity that comes from the characteristics of the host market that would generally tend to 
increase or decrease MNEs’ desire to FDI and export to the market in the same direction.  
Grubert and Mutti (1991) instrument for export sales and estimate a negative coefficient using 
similar data to Lipsey and Weiss (1981), though it is statistically insignificant.   
Blonigen (2001) considers the issue that trade flows may be either finished products that 
are substitutes for the product that would be produced by an MNE’s affiliate in the same country 
or intermediate inputs that would be used by the MNE’s affiliate to produce a finished product.  
The former situation would suggest a negative correlation between “trade” and “FDI”, whereas 
the latter would see a positive association between the two.  Blonigen uses product-level trade 
and FDI data for Japanese 10-digit Harmonize Tariff System (HTS) products in the United States 
to show that new FDI in the US by Japanese firms increases Japanese exports of related 
intermediate inputs for these products, whereas new FDI leads to declines in Japanese exports of 
the same finished products.  Head and Ries (2001) and Swenson (2004) show similar evidence 
when using data on Japanese firm-level data or US industry level data, respectively.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12 An obvious exception is Cushman (1985).   18 
An underlying issue to the discussion above is that relationships between firms (such as 
suppliers of inputs to assemblers) have the power to affect FDI decisions.  Japanese firms often 
have much more formal and public connections between suppliers and assemblers, which are 
called vertical keiretsu.  Head, Ries and Swenson (1995) explores whether location of other 
Japanese firms in a US state or neighboring states by firms of the same vertical keiretsu affects 
subsequent FDI for a Japanese MNE.  They find that it does, particularly for the automobile 
sector, and assign this as evidence for agglomeration economies between such firms with formal 
supplier-assembler relationships.   
Other studies have considered the impact of horiztonal keiretsu on Japanese FDI activity.  
Horizontal keiretsu are conglomerate groupings of firms across many industries, but centered 
around a major Japanese bank.  Three potential effects of such groups for FDI activity have been 
suggested.  The primary potential effect is use of the horizontal keiretsu’s bank as a source of 
cheaper funding, which would increase the firm’s total, as well as foreign investment.  As argued 
by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), such relationships with a member’s keiretsu bank 
can reduce monitoring costs and lowering the cost of capital.  Their analysis of Japanese 
manufacturing firms finds evidence that those in horizontal keiretsu are less liquidity-constrained 
in their investment activity than other firms.  Subsequent studies examined whether membership 
in such horizontal keiretsu increases a Japanese firm’s FDI, but often found insignificance or 
sensitive results (see, e.g., Belderbos and Sleugwaegen, 1996).
14   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 As we will discuss below, an entire literature beginning with Markusen (1984) has developed a similar model of 
“horizontal” FDI in a general equilibrium framework. 
14 These insignificant results may not be surprising in light of Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) which argues that the 
possibility of such economic effects from horizontal groupings is unlikely, particularly the lower cost of capital 
story.  Their main argument is that financing from non-keiretsu sources accounts for the majority of total investment 
financed by keiretsu firms and that this share has been increasing over time.  Although this does not rule out that 
keiretsu financing has an important impact on the margin!   19 
Blonigen, Ellis and Fausten (2005) focuses on another possible effect of these horizontal 
keiretsu – exchange of information.  Executives of the largest firms in a keiretsu often participate 
in “Presidential Council” meetings, where surveys find that information exchange is the primary 
activity.  Blonigen, Ellis and Fausten (2005) hypothesizes that such exchanges may lower the 
costs of acquiring information on sites for future affiliates and lead to a positive effect of 
previous FDI by horizontal keiretsu firms on a firm’s FDI location decision.  Using a data on 
Japanese firm FDI locations across the world from 1985 through 1991, they find that recent FDI 
by fellow horizontal keiretsu firms of at least 100 employees increases the probability of a firm 
locating in that same region by 20%.  They also confirm the findings of Head, Ries and Swenson 
(1995) on the agglomeration effects of vertical keiretsu FDI for a world sample of locations, not 
just US location.  
 
4. General Equilibrium Analysis of FDI Decisions and Location 
Ideally, the FDI literature would have an established model and empirical specification 
that lays out the primary long-run determinants of FDI location.  This would enable sound 
empirical analysis of how such worldwide FDI patterns are affected by government intervention, 
such as taxation and trade policies, while controlling for underlying changes in long-run 
determinants of FDI activity.  As we will see, the literature’s focus on partial equilibrium 
frameworks discussed above is due to the difficulty of building a model that accounts for general 
equilibrium features that is tied back to microeconomic decision making.  The concern with 
evidence from partial equilibrium models is that they ignore important long-run general-
equilibrium factors that affect FDI decisions and locations.  This can then lead to omitted 
variable bias in the empirical specification.  This is particularly a concern when studies run 
cross-sectional data only (which a number of studies discussed above do), since this has an   20 
implicit assumption that the data represent some (long-run) equilibrium.
15  The alternative is to 
examine time series data, assuming that omitted variables reflecting long-run determinants are 
not changing significantly over the time period of the sample – i.e., focus only on the short-run 
factors, assuming long-run factors are constant.  This is probably not reasonable for samples that 
span more than a few years in length.  Thus, there is a real need for an empirical specification 
that can encompass both short- and long-run factors, whereas the literature surveyed above (with 
the exception of papers surveyed in section 2.4) is concerned only with short-run activity.  After 
first discussing why it is difficult to generate such an empirical framework, this section then 
describes the literature’s efforts to construct such an empirical model and what determinants of 
FDI appear to be robust long-run determinants in the literature to this point. 
To understand the evolution of studies on the general-equilibrium determinants of FDI, it 
is informative to look at the parallel literature examining similar issues in trade.  In the latter half 
of the 20
th century until the 1990s, trade theory and trade empirics rarely crossed paths.  The 
period was dominated until the 1980s by the elegant general equilibrium theory of Heckscher-
Ohlin where trade flow predictions are based primarily (exclusively) on differences in relative 
endowments of production factors between countries.  However, attempts to reconcile the theory 
with the data were often unsuccessful, including the Leontief paradox that U.S. exports appeared 
to be more labor-intensive than its imports.
16  A huge hurdle for generating an exact testing 
equation out of the Heckscher-Ohlin model is the possible indeterminancy of trade flow 
predictions from the model when there are more that two countries and more than two factors of 
production. 
                                                            
15 Without this assumption, the possibility of various cross-sectional units displaying out-of-equilibrium behavior 
makes the interpretation of the econometric estimates difficult at best. 
16 This paradox remained in the literature for 30 years until Leamer (1980) found a resolution.  This resolution did 
not address, however, a way in which one could get a general empirical specification from the Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework to model trade flows between countries that could perform as well as the gravity model.   21 
During this time, however, there was an empirical literature that was able to successfully 
fit and predict trade flows between countries.  This specification is known as the gravity model 
of trade, which specifies trade flows between countries as primarily a function of the GDP of 
each country and the distance between the two countries.  Unfortunately, the gravity model 
appeared to have no theoretical foundation and was not held in very high standing by most of the 
profession for decades.   
Recent trade literature has led to a melding of theory and empirics.  First, there has been 
the realization that the gravity specification characterizes basic predictions by many various 
models of trade, including variations of Heckscher-Ohlin (see Deardorff, 1998).  Second, 
theoretical foundations for the gravity model have been established by a series of papers, the 
most recent of which is Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).  As a result, a gravity empirical 
specification for trade flows is now back in fashion, this time with theoretical foundations to 
support it.
17     
Studies of FDI flows are considerably behind the parallel trade literature, but face even 
more daunting issues.  As with trade flows, a gravity specification actually fits cross-country data 
on FDI reasonably well.  However, there is no similar paper to Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) that lays out a tractable model that specifically identifies gravity variables as the sole 
determinants of FDI patterns.  In fact, intuition and theory suggests that MNE and FDI behavior 
is likely much more complicated to model than trade flows.  First, since Markusen (1984) and 
Helpman (1984), MNE general equilibrium theory has suggested two very distinct motivations 
for FDI:  To access markets in the face of trade frictions (horizontal FDI) or to access low wages 
for part of the production process (vertical FDI).  More recently, a number of papers have begun 
                                                            
17 The development of new trade theory no doubt was helpful in this process as it broke the monopoly that 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory had on a generation of ideas in the profession and made researchers open to   22 
to sketch out more complicated patterns of FDI.  For example, an important possibility is export 
platform FDI (Eckholm, Forslid, and Markusen, 2003, and Bergstrand and Egger, 2004) where a 
MNE places FDI into a host country to serve as a production platform for exports to a group of 
(neighboring) host countries.  Another important example is a more complicated vertical 
interaction (or fragmentation) result where affiliates of an MNE in a variety of hosts are shipping 
intermediate goods between them for further processing before shipping a (more) finished 
product back to the parent (see, e.g., Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004).     
Suggestive evidence of these various channels can be seen from US MNE statistics 
collected by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Statistics.  Table 1 provides illustrative data from the 
1999 Benchmark Survey of US MNE activity.  The first column provides data on affiliates’ local 
sales in the country in which they are located.   This presumably matches up with horizontal 
motivations for FDI.  The next column provides data on sales back to the US which is connected 
with vertical motivations for FDI.  The third column of data shows sales by affiliates to 
unrelated parties in other foreign countries which should gauge export platform FDI activity.  
And the final column shows sales by affiliates to affiliates in other foreign countries which could 
be consistent with vertical fragmentation across multiple hosts if these sales are of intermediate 
goods, or more in the spirit of export platform FDI if these are final goods being shipped to a 
related wholesaler in the foreign country.   
One way to interpret Table 1 is that the assumption that FDI is simply horizontal FDI is 
perhaps not a bad one.  Sales to the local market account for about 2/3 of U.S. affiliate sales, and 
this is true even for the Latin America region that is comprised solely of less-developed countries 
with substantially lower wages than the US.  On the other hand, there is reasonable activity in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
considering a variety of alternative theoretical models of trade, one of which underlies the theoretical modeling for 
the gravity empirical specification.    23 
these other types of activities listed in Table 1, suggesting that other motivations play a role as 
well.  As one would expect, affiliate sales back to the US (evidence for vertical motivations of 
FDI) are higher than average for the Latin America region and, interestingly, even higher for 
Canada, where almost 28% of US affiliates there ship back to the US.  Sales to other foreign 
countries as a percent of total sales are largest for Europe, suggesting export platform FDI plays 
a reasonably significant role there. 
The primary issues with translating MNE general equilibrium theory to an empirical 
specification is the complexity of the theoretical models that generally do not have closed form 
solutions and a multitude of dirty data issues connected with country-level measures of MNE 
activity.  One of the first attempts to match predictions of a general equilibrium model of MNE 
behavior to data is Brainard (1993a; 1997).  Brainard (1993a) develops a two-country, two-factor 
general equilibrium model of horizontal MNE activity with a differentiated sector of 
monopolistically competitive firms, where MNEs may arise, and a perfectly competitive 
homogeneous goods sector.  With sufficient assumptions on the model and parameter values, 
Brainard (1997) derives an equation for the proportion of sales by the MNE that are exports to 
total foreign sales (affiliate sales plus exports).  This variable is inversely related to the frictions 
incurred with exporting, such as transport and tariff costs, and directly on the significance of 
plant-level fixed costs.
18  Brainard (1997) uses a cross-section of US affiliate sales and export 
activity by country and industry to test her hypotheses and finds evidence that trade frictions and 
plant level fixed effects have their expected impacts on the ratio of exports to total foreign sales.  
Brainard’s studies were a crucial (first) step, but had a few weaknesses.  First, the assumption in 
the model of symmetrically identical countries precluded analysis of how country “size” matters 
                                                            
18 Brainard labels this a “proximity-concentration trade-off” model because of these relationships though the more 
recent literature labels this “horizontal” MNE activity.     24 
for cross-country FDI, much less how factor endowment differences may matter.  The focus on 
plant-level fixed costs also makes this more a model to examine cross-industry differences than 
cross-country differences.  
A parallel path of developing ever-more sophisticated models of MNE behavior was 
undertaken by James Markusen and co-authors in the 1990s.  Building first off of Markusen 
(1984) to clarify the horizontal model of MNEs, a “knowledge-capital model” was developed in 
Markusen, Venables, Eby-Konan and Zhang (1996) and Markusen (1997) that unified horizontal 
and vertical motivations of MNEs.  Similar to Brainard’s studies, these Markusen models have 
typically been two-country, two-factor, two-sector models.  However, unlike Brainard, the 
imperfectly competitive sector is Cournot oligopolists and there is added complexity in 
assumptions of differing factor requirements for headquarter services of MNEs, production, and 
transportation of goods.  The added complexity and more flexible assumptions means 
simulations, rather than closed-form solutions, are necessary to explore the role of various 
factors on MNE behavior.  An important result of these models is that factor endowments may 
matter significantly for FDI patterns, in addition to the traditional gravity variables, such as trade 
and FDI frictions (that may be proxied by distance) and parent and host market sizes (proxied by 
GDP). 
Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) provided the first empirical examination of the 
knowledge-capital model’s hypotheses.  From numerical simulations of the model they 
conjecture an empirical specification where affiliate sales in a host country is a function of GDP 
of the two countries, trade costs of the two countries, FDI costs, and differences in factor 
endowments between the parent and the host.  The last term is labeled “skill differences” as the 
prediction comes from a two-factor model of skilled and unskilled labor.  The complexity of the 
model gives rise to nonlinearities in the simulated results which the authors capture with a GDP   25 
sum and GDP difference term and interactions between the skill difference, the host country’s 
trade costs, and the GDP difference.  In rough terms, the horizontal side of the model predicts a 
positive coefficient on the GDP sum term, a negative coefficient on the GDP difference term, 
and a positive sign on the host trade cost variable.  The identifying coefficient on the vertical side 
is on the skill difference variable which should be positive.
19  The authors use a panel dataset of 
bilateral country-level US outbound and inbound affiliate sales from 1986-1994, and find 
empirical evidence for both the horizontal and vertical motivations for FDI, consistent with this 
unified “knowledge-capital” model. 
A number of issues are a concern with these important, but initial, attempts to estimate 
general-equilibrium determinants of FDI patterns.  The most specific critique was that of 
Blonigen, Davies, and Head (2003) which points out a significant error in variable specification 
in Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001).  For US inbound affiliate sales, the skill difference 
variable is always negative (foreign countries are always less skilled than the US in the data).  
Thus, a positive coefficient for this variable on these observations is suggesting that affiliate 
sales goes up when skill differences decline!
20  This contrasts with observations of US outbound 
where the skill difference variable is always positive in value and a positive coefficient suggests 
that affiliate sales increases as skill differences increase.  The obvious alternative fixes for this 
are to either estimate a separate coefficient for outbound and inbound observations or specify the 
skill variable as an absolute difference from zero.  Blonigen, Davies and Head (2003) show that 
regardless of how you fix this error, it completely switches the sign from the original Carr, 
                                                            
19 The interaction terms muddy the waters somewhat on expected signs and it is more exact to say that the marginal 
effect of an increase in skill difference between parent and host on affiliate sales should be positive to be consistent 
with vertical motivations. 
20 In other words, an increase in this variable is moving from a negative number to another value close to zero where 
there is no skill difference between the parent and host country.   26 
Markusen and Maskus (2001) paper and no longer supports the vertical motivations for MNE 
activity.
21   
The issue of whether there is evidence for significant vertical FDI is an interesting one.  
An earlier empirical paper by Brainard (1993b) examined whether US affiliate sales back to their 
US parents were sensitive to factor proportion differences using bilateral country data and also 
found little support of this.  Yeaple (2003b), however, runs a specification similar in spirit to 
Brainard with US MNE affiliate activity, but interacts factor endowment differences with 
industry factor intensities and then uncovers vertical motivations (as well as horizontal 
motivations).  Namely, he finds that factor endowment differences increase FDI for industries 
that intensively use the factor in which the host country has the comparative advantage.  Looking 
for the effects of factor endowment differences specifically in the “right” industries is the key.  
These results are also in line with recent micro-level evidence on US affiliate activity by Hanson, 
Mataloni, and Slaughter (2003) and Feinberg and Keene (2001; 2003) that finds substantial 
vertical activity going on for certain manufacturing sectors and host countries and for which 
factor prices and trade costs have the signs one would expect with vertical FDI activity.  It seems 
clear that vertical motivations are not prevalent in the general FDI patterns.  Rather, such 
motivations for FDI show up as important for only a few particular manufacturing sectors, such 
as machinery and electronics.    
Other more general issues with the general-equilibrium models concern data quality and 
characteristics of the data.  As discussed in Blonigen and Davies (2004), residuals from 
estimating the Carr, Markusen, Maskus (2001) empirical specification on a sample of bilateral 
                                                            
21 Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2003) objects to using an absolute difference of the skill variable because it imposes 
symmetry that the model suggests is incorrect.  Thus, allowing a separate coefficient for negative ranges and 
positive ranges of the variable, which in this dataset corresponds to inbound and outbound FDI, respectively, is 
likely the best way to handle this specification issue.  Blonigen, Davies and Head (2003) shows that all these 
alternative specifications lead to a sign reversal of the skill difference coefficient.      27 
observations of FDI to developed and less-developed countries are far from white noise.  In fact, 
the model substantially under-predicts affiliate sales to developed countries and over-predicts 
affiliate sales in less-developed countries even after allowing for interactions of a less-developed 
country dummy with the other independent variables and country fixed effects.
22  There are 
likely two contributing and related factors here.  First, the FDI data are highly skewed with most 
of the activity confined to OECD countries.  One simple way to statistically control for this is to 
log the data, which interestingly is the typical practice with “gravity” models, whereas Carr, 
Markusen and Maskus (2003) used interactions of variables in levels to deal with non-
linearities.
23  In Blonigen and Davies (2004), logging the variables goes a long way toward 
generating white noise residuals, but not completely.  This suggests that the factors that 
determine FDI into developed countries is simply much different than into less-developed 
countries, and that these differences are still not captured adequately in the empirical 
specifications that we currently estimate. 
A final important issue with these previous MNE models and resulting empirical 
examination of their hypotheses is the modeling of a two-country framework with testing done 
on bilateral country pairings.  This assumes that the FDI decisions by MNEs in a parent country 
into a particular host country are independent of their FDI decisions to any other host country.  
But clearly this is not a good assumption for the variety of MNE motivations mentioned above.  
A vertical FDI decision by an MNE involves picking the “best” low-cost host at the expense of 
other potential host locations.  An export platform strategy likewise involves picking the “best” 
host country and presumably leaving other “neighboring” countries in a low-FDI “shadow.” To 
                                                            
22 The specification is also controlling for FDI costs, which include expropriation risks, etc., which may be a large 
concern with FDI into less-developed countries. 
23 An alternative, and more sophisticated, statistical correction is modeling the non-FDI observations (or zeroes) as a 
different first-level process from the decision of how much to FDI conditional on the decision to invest some 
positive amount.  This is the approach in Razin, Rubinstein, and Sadka (2004).   28 
what extent these interdependences still show up in the estimates after aggregating individual 
firm decision-making is an open question.  However, theoretical modeling of such MNE 
decisions will clearly be affected by having more than two countries and one would guess that 
estimation on data reflecting the aggregation of these decisions also needs to account for such 
host-market interdependencies.   
Work on this in the literature is extremely recent, with a number of recent papers 
applying spatial econometric techniques to allow for interdependence of FDI activity (the 
dependent) variable across host countries.  Coughlin and Segev (2000) estimated that FDI into 
neighboring provinces increases FDI into a Chinese province and assign this as evidence of 
agglomeration externalities.
24  In contrast, Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, and Naughton (2004) 
estimate a negative effect of neighboring-country FDI on the amount of US FDI received by a 
European country, while finding that neighboring GDPs increase FDI.  These two effects provide 
evidence for export-platform FDI.
25  Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2004) develop a model of 
MNE activity in a multi-country world that predicts how a variety of neighboring country 
characteristics (GDP, trade costs, endowments, etc.) should affect FDI into a focus country 
depending on MNE motivations (horizontal, vertical, export-platform, etc.).  Using data on US 
outbound FDI in seven manufacturing industries they find mixed evidence that mildly supports 
export-platform and vertical fragmentation MNE motivations in the data.  These studies show 
that spatial interdependence matters for FDI patterns, but that the sample one chooses in 
geographic space to estimate these relationships can substantially affect the estimated 
interdependencies. 
 
                                                            
24 These models typically develop measures of “neighboring” countries’ variables though a matrix of weights 
inversely related to the distance of other countries in the sample.   29 
5. Conclusion  
The literature on the determinants of MNE decisions and FDI location is quite 
substantial, though arguably still in its infancy.  Our theoretical hypotheses come out of 
modeling firm-level decisions.  A large body of literature takes these partial equilibrium 
predictions of a MNE’s FDI decisions and examines how (exogenous) factors, such as taxes and 
exchange rates, affect these firm-level decisions.  A more recent body of literature has begun to 
frame such MNE decisions in a general equilibrium framework and generates predictions of how 
fundamental country-level factors affect aggregate country-level FDI behavior.  Regardless of 
the approach, the interconnectedness of FDI behavior with trade flows and the underlying 
motivation for MNE behavior complicates analysis.  Many strands of the partial equilibrium FDI 
literature have largely ignored this issue, while the general equilibrium models have begun to 
grapple with this issue. 
In the final analysis, the empirical literature on determinants of FDI is still young enough 
that most hypotheses are still up for grabs.  Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that Chakrabarti 
(2001) finds that most determinants of cross-country FDI are fairly fragile statistically.  
However, as this survey of the literature reveals, the issues are complicated enough that broad 
general hypotheses – such as taxes generally discourage FDI – simply should not be expected 
once one takes a closer look.  The more insightful and innovative papers in the literature have 
developed hypotheses about when a factor should matter and when it should not matter, and then 
find creative ways to test these hypotheses in the data.  The ever greater availability of micro-
level data should also help in the future to clear some of the muddy waters.  Again, the better 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
25 Head and Mayer (2004) focuses exclusively on the impact of neighboring regions’ GDP (or “market potential”) 
on Japanese FDI into Europe and find it has a significant positive correlation with FDI.    30 
papers in the literature have been cognizant of how data issues affect interpretation of their 
results, and this will be a key issue as the literature moves forward. 
  
  
 Table 1: Composition of Sales of US Affiliates Abroad, 1999, in Millions of Dollars. 
Local Sales in Host 
Country 
 
Sales Back to US 
Sales to Unaffiliated 
Parties in Other Foreign 
Countries 
Sales to Related 
Affiliates in Other 
Foreign Countries 
 
Dollars  % of Total  Dollars  % of Total  Dollars  % of Total  Dollars  % of Total 
                 
All US Activity  1,494,903  67.4%  230,975  10.4%  216,613  9.8%  276,904  12.5% 
                 
Manufacturing  651,982  58.9%  165,731  15.0%  110,119  9.9%  179,533  16.2% 
Non-Manufacturing  842,921  75.8%  65,244  5.9%  106,494  9.6%  97,371  8.8% 
                 
Canada  197,222  70.1%  78,081  27.8%  3,600  1.3%  2,348  0.8% 
Europe  803,860  65.9%  53,629  4.4%  159,130  13.0%  203,850  16.7% 
Asia and Pacific  304,177  71.4%  47,255  11.1%  30,944  7.3%  43,904  10.3% 
Latin America  165,678  65.9%  43,544  17.3%  18,620  7.4%  23,722  9.4% 
Source: Table III.F.1, US Bureau of Economic AnalysisReferences 
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